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a b s t r a c t
We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary
equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the proposer offers one third times the discount
factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a proposal which is
accepted without delay. Laboratory experiments show various deviations from this equilibrium, where
different offers are typically made and delay may occur before acceptance. We address the issue to
what extent these findings are compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium and characterize the set of
subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any value of the discount factor. We show that for any proposal
in the interior of the space of possible agreements there exists a discount factor such that the proposal is
made and accepted.We characterize the values of the discount factor forwhich equilibriawith one-period
delay exist. We show that any amount of equilibrium delay is possible and we construct subgame perfect
equilibria such that arbitrary long delay occurs with probability one.
© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many decisions in legislatures involve the task of allocating
resources among constituencies with diverse and often opposing
preferences. To analyze such decisions, many authors have studied
extensions of the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to collec-
tive choice problems, see for instance Baron and Ferejohn (1989),
Harrington (1990), Baron and Kalai (1993), and Banks and Duggan
(2000). These papers study multilateral bargaining games, where
an alternative is accepted if it is approved by a set of players that
belongs to a collection of decisive coalitions. This approach makes
it possible to study a variety of important institutional set-ups,
including the one of majority voting.
The Baron and Ferejohn (1989)model, hereafter BFmodel, is the
most frequently used model to study legislative bargaining. Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) consider a bargaining gamewith infinite time
horizon, where the proposer selection process is modeled by time-
invariant recognition probabilities, and acceptance by a simplema-
jority is sufficient to implement a proposal. Eraslan (2002) shows
that stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs are unique
for a rather general specification of the BF model, and Eraslan and
McLennan (2013) show uniqueness of such equilibrium payoffs in
an even more general model. In any stationary equilibrium of the
BFmodel, the proposer offers δ/n to half of the responding players,
nothing to the other responders, and keeps the remainder. Such
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a proposal is accepted without delay. The equilibrium therefore
predicts substantial proposer power, the formation of a minimum
winning coalition, and absence of delay in reaching an agreement.
The BF result has been used as the theoretical benchmark in
many papers in the experimental literature.McKelvey (1991) stud-
ies a bargaining gamewith three voters and a discrete policy space
consisting of three alternatives. Fréchette et al. (2003) use the BF
model with five players as their main treatment and study the
effects of open versus closed amendment rules. Fréchette et al.
(2005) use the BF specification with three players and a discount
factor of 1/2 in their treatments, as well as the case without
discounting, and focus on the influence of nominal bargaining
power on bargaining outcomes. Diermeier and Morton (2006)
consider a version of the BF model with a finite time horizon
and heterogeneous recognition probabilities. Breitmoser and Tan
(2010) consider the BF specification with three players in their
treatments and study in particular whether fairness can explain
some of the experimental findings. Kagel et al. (2010) are inter-
ested in the consequences of veto power in committees and use
the BF specificationwith three players and a discount factor of 0.95
as a benchmark. Miller and Vanberg (2013) use the BF model with
three players and a discount factor of 0.9when comparing the costs
of reaching agreement undermajority andunanimity rule. Agranov
and Tergiman (2014) and Baranski and Kagel (2015) allow players
to communicate after the proposer is selected but before a proposal
is submitted and respectively study the BF model with five players
and a discount factor of 0.8 and the BF model with three players
and no discounting.
The experimental literature finds that the predictions of the sta-
tionary subgame perfect equilibrium in the BF model are violated
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.007
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in several ways, although certain qualitative features like the pres-
ence of proposer power and a tendency to formminimumwinning
coalitions are found. The most striking feature of the data is that
proposers make overly generous offers to the responding players
and keep a much smaller share for themselves than predicted by
the stationary equilibrium. Minimum winning coalitions are not
always formed and even an equal sharing of the surplus with all
players occurs with significantly positive probability. Contrary to
the BF prediction of immediate acceptance, there is a significant
number of observations with delay before a proposal is accepted,
in particular when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
McKelvey (1991) conjectures that subjects may offer too much
to potential coalition partners because of fear of retaliation in later
rounds and Diermeier and Morton (2006) report the use of non-
stationary strategies. For instance, subjects who vote to reject a
proposal on average receive a higher payoff from the new pro-
posal, which is a violation of stationarity since under stationarity
irrelevant parts of the history should be of no influence to future
behavior. Bradfield and Kagel (2015) experimentally investigate
the BF model when the actual bargaining is done by teams, as is
usually the case in committee bargaining, and find clear evidence
for teams retaliating more against proposers whose proposals
were rejected.Many authors,most notably Rubinstein (1991), have
argued against the use of stationary strategies in bargaining. We
are therefore interested in the question whether proposals like for
instance equal sharing of the surplus are compatiblewith subgame
perfect equilibrium and whether delay is possible in subgame
perfect equilibria when stationarity is not imposed.
In this paper we study the BF model with three players. Since
many parliamentary democracies involve three major parties, the
three player case is of considerable importance.1 We characterize
the set of subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for any value of the
discount factor. When the discount factor goes to zero, the set of
subgame equilibrium payoffs shrinks to the unit vector and the
entire surplus is allocated to the player who is recognized as the
proposer in period zero. When the discount factor goes to one, the
set of subgame equilibria payoffs expands to the set of feasible
payoffs. In particular, all inefficient outcomes are supported as
subgame perfect equilibria when the discount factor is sufficiently
high. Our characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilib-
rium utilities is entirely constructive.
Subgame perfect equilibrium, as a function of the discount
factor, exhibits different qualitative properties in the three player
BF model than in the BF model with five or more players. Baron
and Ferejohn (1989) show that in the BF model with five players
any feasible payoff vector may be supported as a subgame perfect
equilibrium payoff for a discount factor exceeding 7/8. Thus in
particular, even the extreme allocations corresponding to the ver-
tices of the set of feasible payoffs could be proposed and accepted
in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Likewise, in the BF model with
more than five players, there exists a discount factor such that
for any feasible division of the surplus there is a subgame perfect
equilibrium such that the given division is proposed in round 0 and
accepted.
This result is not true for the three player BF model. For any
given value of the discount factor, every player’s equilibriumpayoff
has a positive lower bound. It follows that the allocationwhere one
player gets the entire cake can never be supported as a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome, irrespectively of the discount factor.
Furthermore, for any given value of the discount factor, payoff vec-
tors close to the boundary of the feasible set cannot be supported
1 For example, the British political system of the twentieth century consisted of
three major parties representing the Conservatives, Labor, and Liberals. Similarly,
for a long time the German political system had three major parties, the Christian
Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the Liberal Party.
as subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. It is nevertheless the
case that for any vector in the interior of the set of feasible payoffs
there exists a discount factor such that this vector is proposed and
accepted in period 0 in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The results on unanimity bargaining games with three or more
players are likewise different from ours. Thus for instance in
Shaked’s example of unanimity bargaining with three players as
presented in Binmore et al. (1992), for a discount factor greater
than 1/2, any given feasible payoff vector could be proposed and
accepted in a subgame perfect equilibrium. In contrast, in the three
player BF model studied here, for any discount factor greater than
1/2, player’s equilibrium payoff is bounded below by 0.26.
Our paper complements the findings in Li (2014), who also
studies the three player BFmodel. First of all,we consider the entire
set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, both efficient and inef-
ficient, while Li (2014) focuses on the set of efficient proposals. In-
efficiency can arise both because inefficient divisions of the surplus
could be proposed and accepted and because of delay. Our analysis
captures both types of inefficiencies. Thus in particular we derive
the range of discount factors under which the model admits an
equilibrium with one-period delay. Secondly, Li (2014) considers
a version of the model with simultaneous voting, whereas we
take the version where voting is sequential. As a consequence,
our results do not rely on any additional refinement of subgame
perfection such as the requirement that the players do not use
weakly dominated strategies. Finally, the result of Li (2014) relies
on mixed strategies, whereas we only use pure strategies. It turns
out that the set of efficient payoff vectors that can be supported as
a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff in mixed strategies can also
be sustained using pure strategies.
Chatterjee et al. (1993) consider bargaining in the context of
strictly superadditive transferable utility gamesunder the rejector-
proposes protocol and show the usual statement of the folk the-
orem that for a sufficiently high discount factor any individually
rational outcome is possible. Note that the BF model violates
strict superadditivity when viewed as a transferable utility game.
Norman (2002) studies a finite horizon version of the BF model
and shows for the case with at least five players that any interior
division of the surplus can be supported as a subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome if players are sufficiently patient and there
are sufficiently many rounds of bargaining. He also shows inde-
terminacy of the equilibrium outcome whenever there are at least
three players and at least three bargaining rounds.
The BF model with three players is a borderline case where the
usual statement of the folk theorem does not apply, but the set of
subgame perfect equilibria can be sizable. Recall that in the Rubin-
stein (1982) model with two players, there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. Cho and Duggan (2009) analyze a version of
the BF model where an arbitrary number of players bargains on a
one-dimensional ideological spectrum of policies and agents have
single-peaked preferences over policies. Under sequential voting
and some mild assumptions on the order of voting, they find that
only the median ideal alternative can be supported in a subgame
perfect equilibrium. Cho and Duggan (2015) demonstrate that this
result does not carry over to simultaneous and publicly observed
voting, even when voting is assumed to be stage-undominated,
and obtain the support of arbitrary outcomes for arbitrary positive
discount factors.
For the BF model with three players, we provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for one period of delay before acceptance
takes place. We characterize the threshold such that, for any value
of the discount factor greater than the threshold, one period of
delay is possible and for any value of the discount factor smaller
than the threshold all subgame perfect equilibria are characterized
by immediate acceptance. We also demonstrate the possibility of
arbitrary long delay before acceptance takes place in a subgame
perfect equilibrium when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
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For low values of the discount factor, the offers as observed
in experiments are not consistent with stationary equilibrium,
and are not even consistent with subgame perfect equilibrium.
For instance, when the discount factor is equal to 1/2, Fréchette
et al. (2005) find an average share of the proposer for accepted
offers equal to 0.50, lower than the lowest possible share of 0.78
in a subgame perfect equilibrium, which does not differ much
from the stationary equilibrium share of 0.83. For higher values
of the discount factor, the literature reports on experiments with
discount factors equal to 0.9, 0.95, and 1, the experimental findings
on accepted offers are not in contradiction with the predictions
of subgame perfect equilibrium. The experiments by Agranov and
Tergiman (2014) and Baranski and Kagel (2015) allow for com-
munication between the players after the proposer is determined
but before a proposal is made. In treatments with communication,
proposals are much closer to those of the stationary equilibrium.
This suggests that communication can play a role in the selection
of a particular equilibrium.
Regarding delay before reaching an agreement, the experimen-
tal literature finds little delay for experienced subjects when the
discount factor is equal to 0.5, but substantial delay when the
discount factor is equal to 0.9 or higher. We find that the critical
discount factor needed to have subgame perfect equilibria with
one-period delay is slightly above 0.8.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
describe the BF model and derive bounds on subgame perfect
equilibriumutilities as a function of the discount factor. In Section3
we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium utilities condi-
tional on the selection of a proposer and argue that the bounds in
Section 2 are tight. The explicit construction of the subgameperfect
equilibria that reach the bounds is relegated to the Appendix. In
Section 4 we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the
discount factor for one period of delay before acceptance takes
place. In Section 5 we investigate the possibility of arbitrary long
delay before acceptance takes place in a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Section 6 concludes.
2. The bounds for subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs
We consider the three player version of the BFmodel. The set of
players N = {1, 2, 3} has to agree on the choice of a payoff vector
in the set of feasible payoffs
V = {x ∈ R3+ | x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 1}.
In each time period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . nature selects a proposer and
the order of the responders by means of time-invariant recogni-
tion probabilities. More precisely, in the beginning of period t =
0, 1, 2, . . . nature selects each permutation π t : {1, 2, 3} → N
in the set of six possible permutations Π with equal probability.
The choice of the permutation is independent across time periods.
Player π t (1) makes a proposal xt ∈ V . Next Player π t (2) responds
by accepting or rejecting theproposal. Ifπ t (2) accepts theproposal,
the game ends, and the proposal xt is implemented. Otherwise,
Playerπ t (3) reacts to the proposal. If Playerπ t (3) accepts, the game
ends. If Player π t (3) rejects the proposal, period t + 1 begins. The
utility of player i ∈ N who receives outcome xi in period t is δtxi,
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the common discount factor. If no agreement is
ever reached, payoffs are 0.
A history h is the sequence of all actions that have occurred
before a particular decision node in the game. For simplicity we
suppress the elements of the sequence pertaining to the moves by
the responding players: it is understood that in any non-terminal
history both responders have rejected all proposals to date. With
this convention, for t = 0, 1, . . . any non-terminal history is of one
of the following two types:
1. h ∈ H t1 if and only if h is of the form (π0, x0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1,
π t ),
2. h ∈ H t2 if and only if h is of the form (π0, x0, . . . , π t−1, xt−1,
π t , xt ),
where for every k ∈ {0, . . . , t}, π k is a permutation of N and
xk ∈ V . After a history h ∈ H t1, the proposer makes a move and,
after a history h ∈ H t2, a responder accepts or rejects the current
proposal. Histories in H t1 are therefore called proposer histories and
those in H t2 responder histories.
A pure strategy for Player i ∈ N assigns to every history h =
(π0, x0, . . . , π t ) ∈ H t1 with π t (1) = i an element of V , and to every
history h ∈ H t2 with π t (1) ̸= i an accept/reject decision. All our
resultsmake only use of pure strategy profiles. It is an easy exercise
to verify that the bounds we present on equilibrium utilities carry
over to mixed strategy profiles as well.
A strategy is stationary if it does not depend on payoff irrelevant
parts of the history, see Maskin and Tirole (2001) for a precise
formulation of the notion of stationarity. For the BF model, sta-
tionarity means that a player makes the same proposal at every
history in H t1 where he is recognized as a proposer and bases
his accept/reject decisions only on the current proposal and the
identity of the player voting next to him in the current voting
round.
The following result follows from the analysis in Baron and
Ferejohn (1989).
Theorem 2.1. For every δ ∈ [0, 1), a strategy profile is a subgame
perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies if and only if it has the
following form: (1) the recognized player offers δ/3 to one responding
player and keeps 1− δ/3 for himself; (2) a responding player accepts
any proposal in which he receives at least δ/3 and rejects otherwise;
(3) all players receive δ/3 as responding player with ex ante probabil-
ity equal to 1/3.
In equilibrium, the recognized player forms a minimum win-
ning coalition with one responding player, offers the responding
player exactly his continuation utility, offers nothing to the third
player, and keeps the remainder of the surplus. The responding
player who is part of the minimum winning coalition accepts this
proposal.2 The equilibrium in Theorem 2.1 is not unique, since
there is some indeterminacy in the selection by the proposer of
the player who joins the minimum winning coalition. However,
all strategy profiles described in Theorem 2.1 lead to the same
equilibrium payoffs. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show that this
result extends to the case with an odd number n of players, where
now δ(n − 1)/2n is offered to (n − 1)/2 players, 0 to the other
players, and the remainder is kept by the proposer. It follows from
Eraslan (2002) that stationary subgameperfect equilibriumpayoffs
are unique, also when mixed strategies are allowed for.
We now drop the stationarity assumption on strategies. The set
of all subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoff vectors is denoted
byU, a subset ofV . For i ∈ N, let ui be the supremumof SPE payoffs
for Player i and ui be the infimum, so we want to show that
ui = sup{ui ∈ R | u ∈ U},
ui = inf{ui ∈ R | u ∈ U}.
We define the real numbers b and b by
b = 3− 3δ
9− 6δ − δ2 , (2.1)
b = 3− δ
9− 6δ − δ2 . (2.2)
2 On topof stationarity, it is assumed inBaron and Ferejohn (1989) thatwhenever
indifferent, a responder accepts a proposal.
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Fig. 1. Lower bound b and upper bound b on a player’s SPE payoff as a function of δ.
Fig. 1 plots b and b as a function of δ. We want to show that the
supremum and infimum of a player’s SPE payoffs is given by b and
b, respectively, so
u1 = u2 = u3 = b,
u1 = u2 = u3 = b.
The main result of this section is Theorem 2.6, which states that
in any SPE the payoff to any player is bounded from below by b
and from above by b, that is b ≤ ui and ui ≤ b. In Theorem 3.2
in the next section, we show that these bounds are tight: we
explicitly construct an SPE where one player receives a payoff of
b and another player a payoff of b.
Due to the symmetry of the game it is clear that u1 = u2 = u3
and u1 = u2 = u3. We henceforth write simply u instead of ui and
u instead of ui.
The first claim puts an upper bound of 1 on the sum of u and u.
Claim 2.2. It holds that u+ u ≤ 1.
Proof. Consider some u ∈ U . Since u ∈ V , it holds that u1 + u2 ≤
u1 + u2 + u3 ≤ 1, and therefore u1 ≤ 1− u2. We have that
u = sup{u1 | u ∈ U} ≤ sup{1− u2 | u ∈ U}
= 1− inf{u2 | u ∈ U} = 1− u. □
Our next claim puts bounds on the behavior of responders in an
SPE.
Claim 2.3. Consider the subgame following the period 0 proposer
history h = (π ). In any SPE s it holds that
[1] If Player π (1) makes a proposal x ∈ V such that xπ (2) > δu or
xπ (3) > δu, then x is accepted by Player π (2) or by Player π (3).
[2] If Player π (1)makes a proposal x ∈ V such that xπ (2) < δu and
xπ (3) < δu, then x is rejected by both Players π (2) and π (3).
Proof. [1] Let x ∈ V be such that xi > δu for some i ∈ {π (2), π (3)}.
Suppose that according to the strategy profile s the proposal x
is rejected both by Player π (2) and by Player π (3). Consider the
responder history (h, x). The payoff to Player i of the strategy profile
s at (h, x) is at most δu. On the other hand, accepting the proposal x
yields Player i a payoff of xi. Thus Player i has a profitable deviation
at (h, x), leading to a contradiction.
[2] Let x ∈ V be such that xi < δu for both i ∈ {π (2), π (3)}.
Consider Player π (3)’s action at the responder history (h, x). Since
accepting x yields a payoff of xπ (3) and rejecting x gives a payoff
of at least δu, Player π (3) must reject. Consider now Player π (2)’s
action at (h, x). A rejection of x by Player π (2) is followed by the
rejection of x by Player π (3) and so yields Player π (2) a payoff of
at least δu, whereas acceptance leads to a payoff of only xπ (2).We
conclude that Player π (2) must reject x. □
The statement in [1] of Claim 2.3 is subtle. It considers a pro-
posal where one or both responding players receive more than δu.
The claim is that such a proposal is accepted, but the statement
does not specify by whom. Indeed, if both responding players
receive more than δu, then Player π (2) can safely reject such a
proposal in the knowledge that Player π (3) is going to accept it.
Similarly, if the proposal is such that only Player π (3) receives
more than δu, it could still be that Player π (2) accepts it, since
Player π (2) is indifferent whether such a proposal is accepted by
himself or by Player π (3).
The following claim derives bounds on SPE utilities conditional
on the selection of the proposer.
Claim 2.4. Consider the subgame following the period 0 proposer
history h = (π ) and let v = (v1, v2, v3) be the payoffs of an SPE s
conditional on the subgame being reached. It holds that
[1] vπ (1) ≥ 1− δu,
[2] vπ (1) ≤ 1− δu,
[3] vπ (2) ≤ δu and vπ (3) ≤ δu.
Proof. [1] By Claim 2.3 the proposal x where xπ (1) = 1 − δu − ϵ,
xπ (2) = δu+ ϵ, and xπ (3) = 0 is accepted for each ϵ > 0. Since s is
an SPE we have vπ (1) ≥ 1 − δu − ϵ for each ϵ > 0. It follows that
vπ (1) ≥ 1− δu.
[2] Let x be Playerπ (1)’s proposal at h under the strategy profile
s. Suppose first that x is rejected under s. Since this results in at
least one period of delay, it follows that vπ (1) ≤ δu. It follows from
Claim 2.2 that δu ≤ 1 − δu and therefore that vπ (1) ≤ 1 − δu.
Suppose now x is accepted. Then by Claim 2.3 it is the case that
xπ (2) ≥ δuor xπ (3) ≥ δu. Therefore vπ (1) = xπ (1) ≤ 1−xπ (2)−xπ (3) ≤
1− δu.
[3] We have vπ (2) ≤ 1 − vπ (1) − vπ (3) ≤ 1 − vπ (1) ≤ δu,
where the last inequality follows from [1]. The argument for vπ (3)
is similar. □
The equilibrium utility conditional on being the initial proposer
is in between 1 − δu and 1 − δu. Responders have equilibrium
utilities bounded from above by δu. The result carries over to
subgames in later periods t, except that discounting implies that
all utilities should be multiplied by δt .
We now use the claims derived so far to derive a lower bound
on u in terms of δ and u, and an upper bound on u in terms of δ
and u.
Claim 2.5. It holds that
1− δu
3
≤ u ≤ u ≤ 1− δu
3− 2δ .
Proof. Let s be an SPE with payoffs u ∈ U . For each permutation
π ∈ Π, let vπ = (vπ1 , vπ2 , vπ3 ) be the payoff of s conditional on na-
ture choosing π as the initial permutation. Since each permutation
is equally likely, we have
u = 1
6
∑
π∈Π
vπ .
For a permutation π ∈ {(1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2)} it holds that Player
1 is the proposer. By parts [1] and [2] of Claim 2.4 it holds that
1− δu ≤ vπ1 ≤ 1− δu.
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Next, consider a permutation π ∈ Π \ {(1, 2, 3), (1, 3, 2)}.Now
Player 1 is a responding player and so 0 ≤ vπ1 ≤ δu by part [3] of
Claim 2.4. We conclude that
2
6
(1− δu)+ 4
6
0 ≤ u1 ≤ 26 (1− δu)+
4
6
δu.
Since the inequalities hold for every u ∈ U,we have
1
3
(1− δu) ≤ u ≤ u ≤ 1
3
(1− δu)+ 2
3
δu.
Rearranging the last inequality yields the result. □
We are now in a position to prove that the payoff to any player
in any SPE of the game is bounded from below by b and from above
by b.
Theorem 2.6. It holds that b ≤ u ≤ u ≤ b.
Proof. Define the functions f , g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] by
f (y) = 1− δy
3
and g(y) = 1− δy
3− 2δ ,
and let h = g ◦ f . Then the function h is defined by
h(y) = 1− δ(
1−δy
3 )
3− 2δ =
3− δ + δ2y
9− 6δ , y ∈ [0, 1].
By Claim 2.5, we have that
f (u) ≤ u ≤ u ≤ g(u).
Using the fact that g is a non-increasing function, we obtain u ≤
g(u) ≤ g(f (u)), and hence u ≤ h(u). Since h is a non-decreasing
function, we can iterate the last inequality to obtain u ≤ hn(u).
Both f and g are contractions, since δ3 < 1 and
δ
3−2δ < 1. Hence
h is also a contraction. Moreover, b is a fixed point of h. By the
Banach contraction theorem it follows that hn(u) converges to b,
so we have shown that u ≤ b.
An easy computation shows that b = f (b). Since f is a non-
increasing function, we have that
b = f (b) ≤ f (u) ≤ u,
which completes the proof. □
3. Explicit subgame perfect equilibria
In the previous section we have shown that SPE utilities are
bounded from below by b and from above by b. In this section we
show that these bounds are tight by constructing an SPE yielding
Player 2 a payoff of b and Player 3 a payoff of b.
We define
V1 = {v ∈ V | v1 ≥ 1− δb and [v2 ≥ δb or v3 ≥ δb]},
V2 = {v ∈ V | v2 ≥ 1− δb and [v3 ≥ δb or v1 ≥ δb]},
V3 = {v ∈ V | v3 ≥ 1− δb and [v1 ≥ δb or v2 ≥ δb]}.
For i ∈ N, the set Vi gives the payoffs that can be obtained as
SPE utilities conditional on reaching a subgame in period 0 where
Player i is selected as a proposer.
Theorem 3.1. Choose a1 ∈ V1, a2 ∈ V2, and a3 ∈ V3. Then there
exists an SPE such that for each permutation π0 the proposal aπ0(1) is
made and accepted in period 0.
The constructive proof of Theorem 3.1 can be found in the
Appendix. Using Theorem 3.1, it is easy to prove our main result.
Theorem 3.2. It holds that u1 = u2 = u3 = b and u1 = u2 = u3= b.
Proof. For i ∈ N, we choose elements ai ∈ Vi that are the best
for Player 2 and the worst for Player 3, so a1 = (1 − δb, δb, 0),
a2 = (δb, 1−δb, 0), and a3 = (0, δb, 1−δb). Now let s be a strategy
profile that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.1. Since
b = 1
3
(1− δb), (3.1)
b = 1
3
(1− δb)+ 2
3
δb, (3.2)
we find that the strategy profile s yields a payoff of b for Player 2
and a payoff of b for Player 3. □
The example below illustrates that an inefficient proposal could
be proposed and accepted in period 0.
Example 3.3. Take δ = 1/3, so b = 9/31 and b = 12/31. We have
that 1− δb = 27/31 and δb = 3/31. Let
a1 = (27/31, 3/31, 0),
a2 = (0, 27/31, 3/31),
a3 = (3/31, 0, 27/31).
As a1, a2, and a3 lie in the sets V1, V2, and V3, respectively, there is a
subgame perfect equilibrium such that, depending on the identity
of the proposer, the points a1, a2, and a3 are proposed and accepted.
Each of the proposals is inefficient.
It is illuminating to compare our findings here with folk theo-
rems for unanimity bargaining. Consider a gamewith primitives as
in Section 2 where the proposal is implemented only if approved
of by both responders. The main result in Herings et al. (2017)
applies to show that for each δ > 1/2 and each point a in V there
exists a subgame perfect equilibrium such that a is proposed (no
matter who the proposer is) and is approved of by both responders
in period 0. Thus all the payoff vectors in V could be supported
as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. Related folk theorems for
unanimity bargaining games have been established in e.g. Herrero
(1985) and Haller (1986). In contrast, in the majoritarian bargain-
ing game, for any fixed discount factor, there exist payoff vectors
in V that cannot be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
This shows that the result for the unanimity case is qualitatively
different from the majoritarian case.
In any SPE in stationary strategies, the proposer obtains a payoff
of 1− δ/3 in period 0 and one of the responders receives a payoff
of δ/3. The stationary equilibrium is usually taken as a theoret-
ical benchmark in the experimental literature. In this literature,
substantial deviations from this benchmark are found. McKelvey
(1991) describes an experiment with a discrete version of the BF
model. Compared to the stationary prediction, proposers usually
offer too much to the responding players. Diermeier and Morton
(2006) consider a finitely repeated version of the BFmodel. Similar
to McKelvey (1991) and Diermeier and Morton (2006) find little
support for the predictions of the stationary equilibrium. First,
in one third of the cases a positive amount was proposed to all
players, not just to the members of the minimal winning coalition.
Moreover, proposers consistently offer toomuch to other coalition
members. BothMcKelvey (1991) andDiermeier andMorton (2006)
report the use of non-stationary strategies. We verify to what
extent the findings in the experimental literature are consistent
with the non-stationary subgame perfect equilibria as found in
Theorem 3.1. We refer to the responder who is offered the higher
share in the cake as Player j and to the other responder as Player k.
Fréchette et al. (2005) provide experimental evidence for the
under-realization of proposer power and the generosity shown to
voters outside the minimal winning coalition for the BF model
with δ = 0.5 and δ = 1. They consider both treatments with
experienced and treatments with inexperienced players.
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When δ = 1, 39% of the proposals for inexperienced players do
not correspond to the formation of a minimum winning coalition,
a number that is still equal to 23% for experienced players. Even
perfectly egalitarian proposals are observed inmore than 5% of the
cases. A perfectly egalitarian proposal is consistent with subgame
perfect equilibrium when 1 − δb ≤ 1/3, which is equivalent to
δ ≥ (21 − 3√41)/2 ≈ 0.895. The average share of the proposer
for accepted offers is 0.51 for inexperienced players and 0.52
for experienced players, considerably lower than the stationary
equilibrium prediction of 0.67. The average share of Player j is
0.43 for inexperienced players and 0.45 for experienced players,
considerably more than the stationary equilibrium prediction of
0.33. Since we have shown that any proposal and any payoff is
possible in an SPE for discount factors tending to one, these results
would not contradict SPE.
When δ = 0.5, 57% of the proposals for inexperienced players
do not correspond to the formation of a minimum winning coali-
tion, a number that is still equal to 23% for experienced players.
The average share of the proposer for accepted offers is 0.50 for
inexperienced players and 0.59 for experienced players, consider-
ably lower than the stationary equilibrium prediction of 0.83. The
average share of Player j is 0.41 for inexperienced players and 0.39
for experienced players, considerably more than the stationary
equilibrium prediction of 0.17. Our results predict a payoff to the
proposer in the range from 1 − δb = 0.78 to 1 − δb = 0.87. The
payoff to the player who receives the higher share is predicted to
be in the range from δb = 0.13 to δb = 0.22. The payoff to the
player who receives the lower share is predicted to be in the range
from 0 to δb/2 = 0.11. For δ = 0.5 the experimental findings
are not even consistent with SPE. This is not so surprising, since
for such low values of the discount factor, the potential influence
of punishment is quite limited. Fréchette et al. (2005) offer the
reluctance of coalition partners to accept offers much below 1/3
as an explanation of these findings.
Kagel et al. (2010) consider a treatment corresponding to the BF
model with a discount factor δ = 0.95. They report that 40.8% of
the proposals do not correspond to the formation of a minimum
winning coalition. For accepted offers, the average share of the
proposer is 0.458 and for Player j it is 0.44. Very similar results
are found in Breitmoser and Tan (2010), who also study the case
δ = 0.95. The sample estimates are 0.445 to the proposer, 0.359 to
Player j, and 0.172 to Player k. The stationary equilibriumpredicts a
payoff of 0.683 to the proposer, 0.317 to Player j, and 0 to Player k.
Our results predict a payoff to the proposer in the range from
1 − δb = 0.188 to 1 − δb = 0.938. The payoff to the player who
receives the higher share is predicted to be in the range from δb =
0.063 to δb = 0.813. The payoff to the player who receives the
lower share is predicted to be in the range from 0 to δb = 0.406.
Miller and Vanberg (2013) compare the costs of reaching agree-
ment under majority and unanimity rule in the context of an
experimental bargaining game with δ = 0.9. They find patterns
very similar to those reported in the previous literature. Proposers
demand a higher share than they allocate to non-proposers, but
the difference is far from the equilibrium prediction. Interestingly,
approximately half of the proposals in the first period are three-
way equal splits and only one out of five allocates 0 to one of the
non-proposers.
4. Equilibria with one-period delay
The experimental literature shows that one cannot rule out
delay before acceptance takes place. Fréchette et al. (2005) con-
clude that a majority of the proposals are accepted without delay,
however, delays persist until the end of the sessions. They find one
or more rounds of delay for experienced subjects in 5% of the cases
when δ = 0.5, a number increasing to 23% when δ = 1. For
inexperienced subjects, one or more rounds of delay occur in 11%
of the cases when δ = 0.5 and in 32% of the cases when δ = 1.
Kagel et al. (2010) report one or more rounds of delay in 28% of
the cases when δ = 0.95.Miller and Vanberg (2013) consider the
case where δ = 0.9 and find one or more rounds of delay before
acceptance takes place in 25% of the cases.
In this sectionwe derive the necessary and sufficient conditions
to have exactly one period of delay before acceptance takes place
in an SPE. A strategy profile s is said to have one-period delay if,
irrespectively of the moves of nature, the proposal in period 0
is rejected by both responders, and the proposal in period 1 is
accepted by at least one responder. More precisely, the strategy
profile s has one-period delay if for all permutations π0 and π1
the proposal sπ0(1)(π0) is rejected by both Players π0(2) and π0(3),
while the proposal sπ1(1)(π0, sπ0(1)(π0), π1) is accepted byπ1(2) or
π1(3).
Theorem 4.1. There exists an SPE with one-period delay if and only
if δ ≥ 6− 3√3 ≈ 0.804.
The condition δ ≥ 6 − 3√3 is derived from the inequality
1−δb ≤ δb,which expresses that theminimumequilibriumpayoff
conditional on being the proposer should be less than or equal to
the discounted maximum unconditional equilibrium payoff. We
first prove the only if part of Theorem 4.1.
Claim4.2. If there is an SPEwith one-period delay, then δ ≥ 6−3√3.
Proof. Let s be an SPE with one-period delay. Let π0 = (1, 2, 3).
Conditional onπ0, the payoff to Player 1 is atmost δu.On the other
hand, for each ϵ > 0, the proposal (1−δu−ϵ, δu+ϵ, 0) is accepted
by Claim 2.3. Since s is an SPE, we must have 1 − δu − ϵ ≤ δu for
each ϵ > 0, and hence 1 − δu ≤ δu. Since u = b by Theorem 3.2,
we find 1− δb ≤ δb, so
1 ≤ 2δb = 2δ · 3− δ
9− 6δ − δ2 .
Rearranging terms, we find that δ ≥ 6− 3√3. □
To prove the if part of Theorem 4.1, we construct an SPE sˆ
such that on the equilibrium path of play the proposer π0(1) in
period 0 demands the entire surplus, his proposal is rejected, and
the proposal in period 1 by Player π1(1) is accepted leading to an
expected payoff of δb to Playerπ0(1). Any deviation by Playerπ0(1)
results in a payoff of at most 1 − δb. Under the assumption that
1− δb ≤ δb such a deviation is not profitable.
Let τ 1 be the SPE constructed in Theorem 3.1 with a1 = (1 −
δb, δb, 0), a2 = (δb, 1 − δb, 0), and a3 = (δb, 0, 1 − δb). Strategy
profile τ 1 gives an expected payoff of b to Player 1. Similarly, let τ 2
be the SPE provided by Theorem 3.1 with a1 = (1 − δb, δb, 0),
a2 = (0, 1 − δb, δb), and a3 = (0, δb, 1 − δb), and let τ 3 be
the SPE with a1 = (1 − δb, 0, δb), a2 = (0, 1 − δb, δb), and
a3 = (δb, 0, 1− δb). Strategy profile τ 2 gives an expected payoff of
b to Player 2 and τ 3 gives an expected payoff of b to Player 3.
Let γ be the SPE delivered by Theorem 3.1 with a1 = (1 −
δb, δb, 0), a2 = (0, 1−δb, δb), and a3 = (δb, 0, 1−δb). The payoffs
corresponding to γ are (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
The one-period delay strategy profile sˆ is defined by means of
the strategy profiles τ 1, τ 2, τ 3, and γ . The initial proposer π0(1)
proposes to keep the entire surplus, so proposes the unit vector
eπ0(1), a proposal which is rejected. For histories where the initial
proposer has deviated, sˆ is defined to be equal to γ . Otherwise,
starting in period 1, sˆ is defined to be equal to τπ
0(1), where the
period 0 history is deleted before applying τπ
0(1). Whomever is
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the initial proposer in period 0 is maximally rewarded in period 1.
More precisely, we have the following definitions.
For period t = 0,we define
sˆπ0(1)(π
0) = eπ0(1),
sˆπ0(2)(π
0, eπ0(1)) = sˆπ0(3)(π0, eπ0(1)) = r,
sˆπ0(2)(π
0, x0) = γπ0(2)(π0, x0), if x0 ̸= eπ0(1),
sˆπ0(3)(π
0, x0) = γπ0(3)(π0, x0), if x0 ̸= eπ0(1).
When the proposal eπ0(1) is made in period 0, we define sˆ for
histories in period t ≥ 1 by
sˆπ t (1)(π0, eπ0(1), π
1, x1, . . . , π t ) = τπ0(1)
π t (1) (π
1, x1, . . . , π t ),
sˆπ t (2)(π0, eπ0(1), π
1, x1, . . . , π t , xt ) = τπ0(1)
π t (2) (π
1, x1 . . . , π t , xt ),
sˆπ t (3)(π0, eπ0(1), π
1, x1, . . . , π t , xt ) = τπ0(1)
π t (3) (π
1, x1 . . . , π t , xt ).
When the proposal x0 made in period 0 is not equal to eπ0(1), we
define sˆ for histories in period t ≥ 1 by
sˆπ t (1)(π0, x0, . . . , π t ) = γπ t (1)(π0, x0, . . . , π t ),
sˆπ t (2)(π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ) = γπ t (2)(π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ),
sˆπ t (3)(π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ) = γπ t (3)(π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ).
Let ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , t}. For a history h in period t we define
‘‘the tail’’ h−ℓ of h obtained by deleting the first ℓ periods from
h. More precisely, for h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ) we define h−ℓ =
(π ℓ, xℓ, . . . , π t ), and for h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ) we define h−ℓ =
(π ℓ, xℓ, . . . , π t , xt ). In particular h−0 = h.
The claim below makes an almost trivial observation: Assume
that the strategy profile s is an SPE of Γ . Assume furthermore that
the strategy profile sˆ is such that, as soon as some given history
h in period ℓ has been reached, the strategy profile sˆ is equal to s,
where s is applied after deleting the first ℓ periods from the history.
Then sˆ is subgame perfect in the subgame starting at h. For a history
h ∈ H,we denote the player who acts at h by ι(h). For history h, h′,
we write h ≥ h′ if h = h′ or the history h extends the history h′.
Claim 4.3. Let s be an SPE of Γ and let h′ be a history in period ℓ. Let
the strategy profile sˆ be such that sˆι(h)(h) = sι(h)(h−ℓ) for each history
h ≥ h′. Then sˆ is subgame perfect in the subgame starting at h′.
Proof. The subgame starting at history h is isomorphic to the
one starting at h−ℓ. Hence, if there would be a profitable one-shot
deviation from sˆ at h, there would be one from s at h−ℓ. □
As it is clear that sˆ is a strategy profile with one-period delay,
the if part of Theorem 4.1 follows immediately from the following
claim.
Claim 4.4. If δ ≥ 6− 3√3, then sˆ is an SPE.
Proof. Consider the proposer history (π0). Under the strategy
profile sˆ, Player π0(1) makes the proposal eπ0(1), a proposal that
is followed by a rejection, and the acceptance of the proposal
sˆπ1(1)(π0, eπ0(1), π1) next period, leading to an expected payoff of
δb to Player π0(1). We argue that Player π0(1) does not have a
profitable one-shot deviation from sˆπ0(1) at (π0). Consider a one-
shot deviation to x0 ̸= eπ0(1) by Player π0(1). For histories h ≥
(π0, x0), it holds that sˆι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h).
At history (π0), the strategy profile γ requires that the proposal
γπ0(1)(π0) is made and accepted, which gives Player π0(1) a utility
equal to 1 − δb. Since γ is subgame perfect, Player π0(1) does
not have a profitable one-shot deviation from γ , so under γ , the
expected payoff of Player π0(1) following any proposal y is less
than or equal to 1 − δb. Since for histories h ≥ (π0, x0), it holds
that sˆι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h),we find that under sˆ, a one-shot deviation to
x0 ̸= eπ0(1) by Player π0(1) gives him an expected payoff less than
or equal to 1− δb. Since δ ≥ 6− 3√3,we have that 1− δb ≤ δb,
so the one-shot deviation to x0 is not profitable.
Consider the responder history (π0, eπ0(1)). According to sˆ, both
responders reject the proposal eπ0(1). Accepting the proposal gives
a responder a payoff equal to 0 and is clearly not a profitable
deviation from sˆ.
For all other histories, the one-shot deviation property fol-
lows from Claim 4.3. Indeed, consider x0 ̸= eπ0(1). For histo-
ries h ≥ (π0, x0), the one-shot deviation property follows from
Claim 4.3 with h′ = (π0, x0), ℓ = 0, and s = γ . For histories
h ≥ (π0, eπ0(1), π1), the one-shot deviation property follows from
Claim 4.3 with h′ = (π0, eπ0(1), π1), ℓ = 1, and s = τπ0(1). □
5. Arbitrarily long delay
In this section we show that any finite delay is compatible with
an SPE, provided that the players are patient enough. By analogy
with the case of one-period delay, we say that the strategy profile
s has m-period delay if, irrespective of the moves by nature, the
proposals in periods 0, . . . ,m − 1 are rejected, and the proposal
in periodm is accepted.
Let some m ≥ 1 be given. In this section, we specify δ˜ < 1 and
construct a strategy profile s˜withm-period delay such that s˜ is an
SPE whenever δ ≥ δ˜.We let δ˜ be the unique value of δ that solves
the equation
δm
3
= 1− δ 3− δ
9− 6δ − δ2 .
Notice that the right-hand side of this equation is exactly 1 − δb.
This is a decreasing function of δ with value 1 at δ = 0 and value
0 at δ = 1. Hence the solution exists and is unique. Moreover, for
each δ > δ˜ it holds that δm/3 > 1− δb.
Since
0 = δ˜m+2 + 6˜δm+1 − 9˜δm − 27˜δ + 27
≤ δ˜m + 6˜δm − 9˜δm − 27˜δm + 27 = −29˜δm + 27,
it follows that δ˜ ≤ (27/29)1/m.
For δ ≥ δ˜, the vector (δm/3, δm/3, δm/3) belongs to the sets
V1, V2, and V3, since δm/3 ≥ 1 − δb and 1 − δb ≥ δb. We let γ
be the strategy profile provided by Theorem 3.1 with a1 = a2 =
a3 = (δm/3, δm/3, δm/3). The vector (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) also belongs
to the sets V1, V2, and V3. Let τ be the strategy profile provided by
Theorem 3.1 with a1 = a2 = a3 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
We construct a strategy profile s˜ such that on the equilibrium
path of play in periods 0, . . . ,m − 1 the proposers demand the
entire surplus and their proposals are rejected. If period m is
reached without deviations, the history of the preceding periods
is deleted and as of period m the strategy profile τ is followed.
In particular, on the equilibrium path of play, the equal split is
proposed and accepted in periodm. However, as soon as a proposer
deviates in someperiod ℓ < m, the history of the preceding periods
is deleted, and the strategy profile γ is followed.
We partition the set H of histories into pairwise disjoint sets
D−1,D0, . . . ,Dm as follows:
D−1 = {h ∈ H | (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , πm−1, eπm−1(1)) ≥ h},
for 0 ≤ ℓ < m,
Dℓ =
{
h ∈ H | ∃xℓ ∈ V \ {eπℓ(1)} such that h
≥ (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , π ℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), π ℓ, xℓ)
}
,
and
Dm =
{
h ∈ H | h ≥ (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , πm−1, eπm−1(1), πm)} .
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The set D−1 contains histories on the equilibrium path before
periodm. The setDℓ consists of historieswith a deviation occurring
in period ℓ < m. Histories in the set Dm involve at least m periods
and are without deviations in the firstm periods.
We define the strategy profile s˜ as follows:
s˜πℓ(1)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
ℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), π
ℓ) = eπℓ(1), 0 ≤ ℓ < m, (5.1)
s˜πℓ(2)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
ℓ, eπℓ(1)) = r, 0 ≤ ℓ < m, (5.2)
s˜πℓ(3)(π
0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
ℓ, eπℓ(1)) = r, 0 ≤ ℓ < m, (5.3)
s˜ι(h)(h) = τι(h)(h−m), h ∈ Dm, (5.4)
s˜ι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h−ℓ), h ∈ Dℓ,
0 ≤ ℓ < m. (5.5)
Eqs. (5.1)–(5.3) specify s˜ on the set of historiesD−1, Eq. (5.4) onDm,
and Eq. (5.5) on Dℓ for ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}.
From Eq. (5.4) we get
s˜πm(1)(π0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
m−1,
eπm−1(1), π
m) = τπm(1)(πm) =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
, (5.6)
s˜πm(2)(π0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
m−1,
eπm−1(1), π
m,
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
) = τπm(2)
(
πm,
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
))
= a, (5.7)
s˜πm(3)(π0, eπ0(1), . . . , π
m−1,
eπm−1(1), π
m,
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
) = τπm(3)
(
πm,
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
))
= a. (5.8)
Eqs. (5.1)–(5.3) and (5.6)–(5.8) specify the equilibrium path of play
under s˜: The proposals eπ0(1), . . . , eπm−1(1) are made and rejected,
followed by the proposal (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), which is accepted. Thus
the strategy profile s˜ has m-period delay. All players receive a
payoff of δm/3. Eq. (5.4) specifies the play of the game as of period
m, provided that no deviations have occurred before period m.
Eq. (5.5) specifies the continuation play following a deviation in
period ℓ < m.
In case m = 1, the construction above resembles that in the
previous section. One difference is that here the play following
histories of the form (π0, eπ0(1), π1) as defined by Eq. (5.4) is
independent of the permutation π0, whereas in the preceding
section it does depend on π0(1).
Theorem 5.1. Let some m ≥ 1 be given. For every δ ≥ δ˜, it holds
that s˜ is an SPE with m-period delay.
Proof. We show that there are no profitable one-shot deviations
from s˜.
For some ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, consider the proposer history
(π0, eπ0(1), . . . , π ℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), π ℓ). Under the strategy profile s˜,
Player π ℓ(1) receives a payoff of δm/3. Consider a one-shot devi-
ation to xℓ ̸= eπℓ(1) by Player π ℓ(1). For histories h ≥ (π0, eπ0(1),
. . . , π ℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), π ℓ, xℓ), it holds that s˜ι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h−ℓ).
At history (π ℓ), the strategy profile γ requires that the proposal
(δm/3, δm/3, δm/3) is made and accepted. Since γ is subgame
perfect for δ ≥ δ˜, Player π ℓ(1) does not have a profitable one-shot
deviation from γ , so under γ , the expected payoff of Player π ℓ(1)
following any proposal y is less than or equal to δm/3. Since for
histories h ≥ (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , π ℓ−1, eπℓ−1(1), π ℓ, xℓ), it holds that
s˜ι(h)(h) = γι(h)(h−ℓ), we find that under s˜, a one-shot deviation
to xℓ ̸= eπℓ(1) by Player π ℓ(1) gives him an expected payoff less
than or equal to δℓδm/3. The one-shot deviation is therefore not
profitable.
For some ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, consider the responder history
h = (π0, eπ0(1), . . . , π ℓ, eπℓ(1)). According to s˜, both responders
reject the proposal eπℓ(1). Accepting the proposal gives a responder
a payoff equal to 0 and is clearly not a profitable deviation from s˜.
For histories in D0, . . . ,Dm, the one-shot deviation property
follows by an application of Claim 4.3. □
6. Conclusion
In this paper we consider the Baron and Ferejohn (1989)model,
where three players use majority voting to divide a surplus in
the presence of discounting. We give a complete characterization
of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any value
of the discount factor. Our results reveal that the behavior of
subgame perfect equilibrium in the BF model with three player is
different from that in the case of five ormore players. Indeed, in the
three player case, for any given value of the discount factor there
exist feasible payoff vectors that cannot arise as subgame perfect
equilibrium payoffs. Nevertheless, we show that, given a vector in
the interior of the set of feasible payoffs, there exists a discount
factor such that the given vector is a subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome.
Many papers in the experimental literature use the subgame
perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as a benchmark and
conclude that this equilibrium is not supported by the data. The
experimental findings are however not in contradiction to the
predictions of subgame perfect equilibrium once the stationarity
assumption is dropped and the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Experimental evidence for a discount factor as low as 1/2 cannot
be explained by non-stationary subgame perfect equilibria. Exper-
imental papers also find significant amounts of delay before an
acceptance takes place, where the delay probability increases with
the discount factor. We provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions on the discount factor to have one period of delay, and we
construct subgame perfect equilibria where arbitrary long delay
occurs whenever the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Appendix. The proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem3.1 is proven separately in two subsections for the case
δ ≤ 3/5 and for the case δ > 3/5. In both cases the strategy profile
s is constructed along the same lines.
We introduce some additional notation. Consider a responder
history (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ). We denote the proposer π t (1) in pe-
riod t by pt . The responders in period t are denoted by jt and kt ,
respectively, where jt is chosen such that his share in the cake
weakly exceeds that of player kt , and jt = π t (2) in case both shares
are equal, so
jt =
{
π t (2), if [xt
π t (2) ≥ xtπ t (3)],
π t (3), if [xt
π t (3) > x
t
π t (2)].
To avoid excessive notation, we write xtj and x
t
k instead of x
t
jt and
xtkt , respectively. A proposer history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt , π t+1)
uniquely defines the finite sequence
h∗ = (p0, x0, j0, k0, . . . , pt , xt , jt , kt , pt+1).
We define the strategy for the proposer using sequences of this
form, leading to functions ρ0, ρ1, . . .. These functions are defined
recursively as follows. Set ρ0(p0) = ap0 and for each t ≥ 0 let
ρt+1(p0, . . . , pt , xt , jt , kt , pt+1)
= f (pt , xt , jt , kt , pt+1, ρt (p0, . . . , pt )),
where each of the subsections below uses a particular specification
for the function f .With a minor abuse of notation we write ρt (h)
rather than ρt (h∗).
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Table 1
f (pt , xt , jt , kt , pt+1, xt ).
pt jt kt pt+1 = 1 pt+1 = 2 pt+1 = 3
1 2 3 (1− δb, 0, δb) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
1 3 2 (1− δb, δb, 0) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
2 1 3 (1− δb, δb, 0) (0, 1− δb, δb) (0, δb, 1− δb)
2 3 1 (1− δb, δb, 0) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (0, δb, 1− δb)
3 1 2 (1− δb, 0, δb) (0, 1− δb, δb) (0, δb, 1− δb)
3 2 1 (1− δb, 0, δb) (0, 1− δb, δb) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
Table 2
f (pt , xt , jt , kt , pt+1, yt ) if xt ̸= yt .
pt jt kt pt+1 = 1 pt+1 = 2 pt+1 = 3
1 2 3 (1− δb, δb, 0) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (0, δb, 1− δb)
1 3 2 (1− δb, 0, δb) (0, 1− δb, δb) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
2 1 3 (1− δb, δb, 0) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
2 3 1 (1− δb, 0, δb) (0, 1− δb, δb) (0, δb, 1− δb)
3 1 2 (1− δb, 0, δb) (δb, 1− δb, 0) (δb, 0, 1− δb)
3 2 1 (1− δb, δb, 0) (0, 1− δb, δb) (0, δb, 1− δb)
The proof of Theorem 3.1 for δ ≤ 3/5
Throughout this subsection it is assumed that δ ≤ 3/5. The
function f is defined in Tables 1 and 2. If after the proposer history
h in period t the proposer complies with his strategy and makes
a proposal xt = ρt (h), then the proposals in period t + 1 are
determined by Table 1. If the proposer deviates from his strategy
andmakes a proposal xt ̸= ρt (h), then the proposals in period t+1
are determined by Table 2. The first three columns of the tables list
the six possible values for (pt , jt , kt ), and the last three columns
specify f (pt , xt , jt , kt , pt+1, yt ) for each of the three possible values
of pt+1.
We define the strategy profile s as follows:
1. For each t ≥ 0, for each history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ), Player
pt proposes ρt (h).
2. After history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ), Player jt accepts xt if
• xt = ρt (h) or
• xtj ≥ δb,
and rejects otherwise.
3. After history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ), Player kt accepts xt if
• [xt = ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3+ δb] or
• [xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δb],
and rejects otherwise.
Fig. 2 shows some key thresholds as a function of δ.
The intuition behind strategy profile s is as follows. Table 1
determines ρt+1(h) after a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , xt , π t+1) such
that xt = ρt (π0, x0, . . . , π t ). In other words, it describes the
proposal to be made after the equilibrium proposal was made and
rejected in the previous period. According to Table 1, in period t+1
Player pt obtains the best possible expected outcome, 13 (1− δb)+
2
3 δb = b, as an encouragement for making the proposal described
by s in the previous period; Player jt obtains the worst possible
expected outcome, 13 (1 − δb) = b, as a punishment for rejecting
the proposal described by the strategy profile; Player kt receives
the remainder, which is equal to b+ δb/3.
Table 2 determines ρt+1(h) after a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , xt ,
π t+1) such that xt ̸= ρt (π0, x0, . . . , π t ). In other words, it de-
scribes the proposal to be made after a deviation by the proposer
in the previous period. According to Table 2, Player pt obtains an
Fig. 2. Key thresholds as a function of δ.
expected outcome of b + δb/3, as a punishment for deviating in
the previous period. Player jt obtains the best possible expected
outcome of b, as an encouragement for rejecting a proposal that
was not described by the strategy profile. Player kt receives the
remainder, which is equal to b in expected terms.
The proof that the strategy profile s defined above is an SPE
proceeds by verifying that no player has a profitable one-shot
deviation from s. The fact that s is an SPE then follows from
the well-known one-shot deviation principle, see Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991).
The proof is divided into five steps. Claim A.1 states that s has
the ‘‘no delay property’’, Claim A.2 shows that after any responder
history h the responder who receives the lower share has no prof-
itable one-shot deviation from s at h. Claim A.3 show that after any
responder history h the responder who receives the higher share
has no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h. Claim A.4 show
that proposals xt ̸= ρt (h) which give to the proposer more than
1−δb are rejected by both responders. And finally, ClaimA.5 shows
that after any proposer history h the proposer has no profitable
one-shot deviation from s at h.
Claim A.1. The strategy profile s has the following no delay property:
if after a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ) the players play according to
the strategy profile s, then ρt (h) is proposed and accepted by one of
the responders and the game ends.
Proof. The claim is immediate from the definition of s. Indeed, the
proposer proposes xt = ρt (h),which is accepted by Player jt . □
We now turn to the absence of profitable deviations by the
player who receives the smaller share.
Claim A.2. Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ). Player kt has
no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Proof. According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts xt if
[xt = ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3+ δb] or [xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δb], and
rejects otherwise. We consider four cases:
1. xt = ρt (h) and xtk < δ2b/3+ δb,
2. xt = ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3+ δb,
3. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk < δb,
4. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δb.
The behavior of Player kt is irrelevant if Player jt responds after
Player kt and accepts. So in the following we only need to consider
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the case where Player jt moves before Player kt or Player jt moves
after Player kt and rejects.
Case 1. xt = ρt (h) and xtk < δ2b/3+ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the pro-
posal, which leads to an expected payoff of δt+1(δb/3 + (1 −
δb)/3) = δt+1(δb/3 + b) = δt (δ2b/3 + δb). If Player kt deviates
and accepts, this gives him a payoff less than δt (δ2b/3 + δb). So
acceptance is not a profitable deviation.
Case 2. xt = ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3+ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts the pro-
posal, which leads to a payoff of at least δt (δ2b/3 + δb). If Player
kt deviates and rejects, the expected payoff is δt (δ2b/3 + δb). So
rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Case 3. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk < δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the pro-
posal, leading to an expected payoff of δt+1(1 − δb)/3 = δt+1b.
If Player kt deviates and accepts, it leads to a payoff less than δt+1b.
So acceptance is not a profitable deviation.
Case 4. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts the pro-
posal, which leads to a payoff of at least δt+1b. If Player kt deviates
and rejects, the expected payoff is δt+1b. So rejection is not a
profitable deviation. □
We now turn to the absence of profitable deviations by the
player who receives the higher share.
Claim A.3. Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ). Player jt has
no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Proof. According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts xt if
[xt = ρt (h)] or [xtj ≥ δb], and rejects otherwise. We consider three
cases:
1. xt = ρt (h),
2. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtj ≥ δb,
3. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtj < δb.
The behavior of Player jt is irrelevant if Player kt responds after
Player jt and accepts. So in the following we only need to consider
the case where Player kt moves before Player jt or Player kt moves
after Player jt and rejects.
Case 1. xt = ρt (h).
Note that if xt = ρt (h), then xtj ≥ δb. Indeed, if xt = a, then xtj ≥
δb. Moreover, any proposal described by Tables 1 and 2 satisfies
xtj = δb or xtj = δb. According to the strategy profile s, Player jt
accepts, which leads to a payoff of δtxtj ≥ δt+1b. If Player jt rejects
xt , this leads to an expected payoff of δt+1(1 − δb)/3 = δt+1b. So
rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Case 2. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtj ≥ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts,which leads
to a payoff of at least δt+1b. If Player jt deviates and rejects xt , this
leads to an expected payoff of δt+1((1 − δb)/3 + 2δb/3) = δt+1b.
So rejection is not a profitable deviation.
Case 3. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtj < δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects, which leads
to an expected payoff of δt+1((1−δb)/3+2δb/3) = δt+1b. If Player
jt deviates and accepts, he receives a payoff less than or equal to
δt+1b. So acceptance is not a profitable deviation. □
We have checked that responders have no profitable one-shot
deviations. We now turn our attention to the proposer. The fol-
lowing claim states that whenever a proposer deviates from s and
demands a share larger than 1− δb, the proposal will be rejected.
Claim A.4. Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ). A proposal
xt ̸= ρt (h) such that xtpt > 1− δb is rejected by both responders.
Proof. Note that xtj + xtk < δb. Since by definition Player kt is the
responder who is offered the smaller share, we have xtk < δb/2.
Moreover, the assumption δ ≤ 3/5 implies δb/2 ≤ δb, thus
xtk < δb. It follows by the definition of s that Player k
t rejects the
proposal xt . Player jt rejects the proposal xt since xtj < δb. □
The next claim states that a proposer does not have a profitable
one-shot deviation.
Claim A.5. Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ). Player pt has no
profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Proof. If ρt (h) = a, then atpt ≥ 1 − δb. Moreover, any proposal
x described in both Tables 1 and 2 satisfies xpt = 1 − δb or
xpt = 1 − δb. Since the proposal ρt (h) is accepted, it follows that
following s leads to a payoff greater than or equal to δt (1− δb) for
Player pt .
If Player pt proposes xt ̸= ρt (h) such that xtpt > 1 − δb, then
the proposal is rejected by Claim A.4 and the expected payoff for
Player pt is equal to δt+1((1− δb)/3+ δb/3) ≤ δt (1− δb).
If Player pt proposes xt ̸= ρt (h) such that xtpt ≤ 1 − δb, then
the proposal is either accepted and leads to a payoff of δtxtpt ≤
δt (1− δb), or rejected and leads to an expected payoff of δt+1((1−
δb)/3+ δb/3) ≤ δt (1− δb). In both cases, the payoff of Player pt is
less than or equal to δt (1− δb). □
The proof of Theorem 3.1 for δ > 3/5
Throughout this subsection it is assumed that δ > 3/5. The
proof of the previous subsection breaks down, since Claim A.4 is no
longer true. If δ > 3/5, it is no longer guaranteed that a proposal
xt ̸= ρt (h) such that xtpt > 1− δb is rejected by responder kt , since
it is not necessarily the case that xtk ≤ δb.We therefore change the
construction of the strategy profile s and replace Table 2 by Table 3.
As before Table 1 gives the values for f (pt , xt , jt , kt , pt+1, yt ) when
xt = yt and Table 3when xt ̸= yt . For xtk ∈ [0, 1/2], θ (xtk) measures
the excess of xtk over δbwhen δb < x
t
k < δb/2 and is equal to zero
otherwise. Notice that when δ > 3/5, it holds that b < b/2.More
precisely, θ (xtk) is defined by
θ (xtk) =
{
xtk/δ − b, if δb < xtk < δb/2,
0, otherwise. (A.1)
If θ (xtk) = 0, then Table 3 is identical to Table 2. In case θ (xtk) ̸=
0, Player jt obtains an expected payoff of b− θ (xtk). Player jt is still
rewarded for rejecting a proposal that was not described by the
strategy profile, but he shares a part of the reward with Player kt ,
who receives the remainder xtk/δ. This makes Player k
t indifferent
between accepting and rejecting xtk.
We define the strategy profile s as follows:
1. For each t ≥ 0, for each history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ), Player
pt proposes ρt (h).
2. After history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ), Player jt accepts xt if
• [xt = ρt (h)] or
• [xtk ≤ δb and xtj ≥ δb] or
• [δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb+ δb− xtk] or
• [xtk ≥ δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb],
and rejects otherwise.
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Table 3
f (pt , xt , jt , kt , pt+1, yt ), where xt ̸= yt and θ = θ (xtk).
pt jt kt pt+1 = 1 pt+1 = 2 pt+1 = 3
1 2 3 (1− δb, δb− θ, θ ) (δb, 1− δb− θ, θ ) (0, δb− θ, 1− δb+ θ )
1 3 2 (1− δb, θ, δb− θ ) (0, 1− δb+ θ, δb− θ ) (δb, θ, 1− δb− θ )
2 1 3 (1− δb− θ, δb, θ ) (δb− θ, 1− δb, θ ) (δb− θ, 0, 1− δb+ θ )
2 3 1 (1− δb+ θ, 0, δb− θ ) (θ, 1− δb, δb− θ ) (θ, δb, 1− δb− θ )
3 1 2 (1− δb− θ, θ, δb) (δb− θ, 1− δb+ θ, 0) (δb− θ, θ, 1− δb)
3 2 1 (1− δb+ θ, δb− θ, 0) (θ, 1− δb− θ, δb) (θ, δb− θ, 1− δb)
3. After history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ), Player kt accepts xt if
• [xt = ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3+ δb] or• [xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δb/2],
and rejects otherwise.
The proof of the fact that the strategy profile s described above
is an SPE is divided into six steps, five of which are the same as in
the proof for δ ≤ 3/5. We need one additional step to provide a
bound on θ (xtk).
Claim A.6 states that s has the ‘‘no delay property’’.
Claim A.6. The strategy profile s has the following no delay property:
if after a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ) the players play according to
the strategy profile s, then ρt (h) is proposed and accepted by one of
the responders and the game ends.
Proof. The claim is immediate from the definition of s. Indeed, the
proposer proposes xt = ρt (h),which is accepted by Player jt . □
Claim A.7 shows that, after any responder history h, the re-
sponder with the smaller share, kt , has no profitable one-shot
deviations from s at h.
Claim A.7. Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ). Player kt has
no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Proof. According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts xt if
[xt = ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3 + δb] or [xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δb/2],
and rejects otherwise. We consider five cases:
1. xt = ρt (h) and xtk < δ2b/3+ δb - the proof is the same as in
Claim A.2,
2. xt = ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δ2b/3+ δb - the proof is the same as in
Claim A.2,
3. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≤ δb - the proof is the same as in Claim A.2,
4. xt ̸= ρt (h) and δb < xtk < δb/2,
5. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δb/2.
The behavior of Player kt is irrelevant if Player jt responds after
Player kt and accepts. So in the following we only need to consider
the case where Player jt moves before Player kt or Player jt moves
after Player kt and rejects.
Case 4. xt ̸= ρt (h) and δb < xtk < δb/2.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the pro-
posal. Recalling that θ (xtk) = xtk/δ−b and using Eq. (3.1), the result-
ing expected payoff is equal to δt+1
( 1
3 (1− δb+ θ (xtk))+ 13θ (xtk)+ 13θ (xtk)
) = δt+1 ( 13 (1− δb)+ θ (xtk)) = δt+1(b + θ (xtk)) = δtxtk.
If Player kt deviates and accepts, he obtains a payoff of δtxtk. So
acceptance is not a profitable deviation.
Case 5. xt ̸= ρt (h) and xtk ≥ δb/2.
According to the strategy profile s, Player kt accepts the pro-
posal, which leads to a payoff of at least δtδb/2. If Player kt deviates
and rejects, he obtains an expected payoff of δt+1((1 − δb)/3) =
δt+1b < δtδb/2 for δ > 3/5. So rejection is not a profitable
deviation. □
Claim A.8 puts a bound on θ (xtk).
Claim A.8. For every xtk ∈ [0, 1/2], it holds that θ (xtk) < δ(b− b).
Proof. It follows from the definition that θ (xtk) <
1
2b− b. Hence
δb− θ (xtk) > δb−
1
2
b+ b = (δ − 1
2
)b+ b > (δ − 1
2
)2b+ b
= 2δb > δb,
where we have used the fact that δ > 3/5 and b > 2b > 0. □
ClaimA.9 shows that, after any responder history h, the respon-
der with the higher share, jt , has no profitable one-shot deviation
from s at h.
Claim A.9. Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t , xt ). Player jt has
no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Proof. According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts xt if
• [xt = ρt (h)] or
• [xtk ≤ δb and xtj ≥ δb] or
• [δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb+ δb− xtk] or
• [xtk ≥ δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb],
and rejects otherwise. We consider five cases:
1. xt = ρt (h),
2. xt ̸= ρt (h) and [xtk ≤ δb or xtk ≥ δb/2] and xtj ≥ δb - the proof
is the same as in Claim A.3,
3. xt ̸= ρt (h) and [xtk ≤ δb or xtk ≥ δb/2] and xtj < δb,
4. xt ̸= ρt (h) and δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb+ δb− xtk,
5. xt ̸= ρt (h) and δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj < δb+ δb− xtk.
The behavior of Player jt is irrelevant if Player kt responds after
Player jt and accepts. So in the following we only need to consider
the case where Player kt moves before Player jt or Player kt moves
after Player jt and rejects.
Case 1. xt = ρt (h).
First we argue that if xt = ρt (h), then xtj ≥ δb. If xt = a,
then xtj ≥ δb. Moreover, any proposal in Table 1 satisfies xtj = δb
or xtj = δb. And any proposal in Table 3 offers the responders
the shares δb and θ (xt−1k ), or the shares δb − θ (xt−1k ) and 0, or
δb − θ (xt−1k ) and θ (xt−1k ). In view of Claim A.8, in either case one
of the two responders is offered at least δb, so xtj ≥ δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts, leading to
a payoff δtxtj ≥ δt+1b. If Player jt deviates and rejects xt , this leads
to an expected payoff of δt+1(1− δb)/3 = δt+1b. So rejection is not
a profitable deviation.
Case 3. xt ̸= ρt (h) and [xtk ≤ δb or xtk ≥ δb/2] and xtj < δb.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects, leading to
an expected payoff of δt+1((1 − δb)/3 + 2δb/3) = δt+1b. If Player
jt deviates and accepts, he receives a payoff less than δt+1b. So
acceptance is not a profitable deviation.
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Case 4. xt ̸= ρt (h) and δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj ≥ δb+ δb− xtk.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt accepts, leading to
a payoff of at least δt+1b + δt+1b − δtxtk. If Player jt deviates and
rejects, this leads to an expected payoff of
δt+1(
1
3
(1− δb− θ (xt−1k ))+
2
3
(δb− θ (xt−1k ))) = δt+1(b− θ (xt−1k ))
= δt+1b+ δt+1b− δtxtk,
wherewe used (3.1) and the fact that θ (xtk) = xtk/δ−b. So rejection
is not a profitable deviation.
Case 5. xt ̸= ρt (h) and δb < xtk < δb/2 and xtj < δb+ δb− xtk.
According to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects, leading to
an expected payoff of δt+1b+ δt+1b− δtxtk. If Player jt deviates and
accepts, this gives him a payoff of at most δt+1b+ δt+1b− δtxtk. So
acceptance is not a profitable deviation. □
Claim A.10 shows that a proposal xt ̸= ρt (h) which gives to the
proposer more than 1− δb is rejected by both responders.
Claim A.10. Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ). A proposal
xt ̸= ρt (h) such that xtpt > 1− δb is rejected by both responders.
Proof. Note that xtj + xtk < δb. Since kt is the responder who is
offered the smaller share, we have xtk < δb/2. According to the
strategy profile s, Player kt rejects the proposal. Consider player jt .
If xtk ≤ δb then, according to the strategy profile s, Player jt rejects
the proposal as xtj < δb. If δb < x
t
k < δb/2 then, according to the
strategy profile s, Player jt rejects the proposal as
xtj ≤ 1− xtpt − xtk < 1− (1− δb)− xtk
= δb− xtk < δb+ δb− xtk. □
Claim A.11 shows that after any proposer history h, the pro-
poser has no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Claim A.11. Consider a history h = (π0, x0, . . . , π t ). Player pt has
no profitable one-shot deviation from s at h.
Proof. First we argue that following s leads to a payoff of at least
δt (1− δb) for Player pt . If ρt (h) = a, then atpt ≥ 1− δb. Otherwise,
according to s, the proposer demands one of the four shares: 1−δb,
1 − δb, 1 − δb + θ (xt−1k ), and 1 − δb − θ (xt−1k ). Each of these is at
least 1− δb,where the fact that 1− δb− θ (xt−1k ) is at least 1− δb
follows from Claim A.8.
If Player pt proposes xt ̸= ρt (h) such that xtpt > 1 − δb, then
the proposal is rejected according to Claim A.10 and the expected
payoff for Player pt is equal to δt+1((1 − δb)/3 + δb/3) ≤ δt
(1− δb).
If Player pt proposes xt ̸= ρt (h) such that xtpt ≤ 1 − δb, then
the proposal is either accepted and leads to a payoff of δtxtpt ≤
δt (1−δb), or is rejected and leads to an expected payoff of δt+1((1−
δb)/3+ δb/3) ≤ δt (1− δb). □
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